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Not necessarily. Instead, careful elaboration might 
help to place each respective crisis in its appropriate 
context. Social democracy’s troubles might indeed 
be considered a crisis for those regarding it as vital 
to a well-functioning society. For those, the potential 
effects of such a crisis might be devastating—even if 
they are not life-threatening. The difficult situation 
might lead the way to new terrain, to an unknown 
future. In this respect the term ‘crisis’ might still be 
appropriate. The non-predictability of events consid-
ered to be crises are—to state this here—an integral 
part of ‘crisis’ as such. Yet, we should not forget the 
qualitative difference of such a dilemma and that 
of Darfur, where the crisis does not remain on the 
abstract, speculative level, but instead deeply affects 
(and destroys) people’s lives. If we remain aware of 
these crucial differences and put the events named 
‘crisis’ into their appropriate context, we might be 
able to break up this ‘category of the mind’, thereby 
understanding the multifaceted nature of ‘crisis’.
This current issue of Schlossplatz3 can merely spark a 
discussion on such a broad term. By looking at a range 
of different crises, we aim to offer an impression of 
the manifold nature of ‘crisis’ as discussed above. Not 
only, however, do we aim to show where crisis can 
occur, we also chose to focus on crisis management. 
In the end, ‘crisis’ as such might include hardship and 
insecurity, but, at the same time, it also challenges 
old categories of thinking and traditional ways of 
‘getting things done’. It is—with all difficulties and 
crises surrounding us—crucial to maintain an eye for 
the broader perspective, focusing on the renewal and 
positive change that crisis might bring. Crisis as an 
instance of learning, crisis management as an institu-
tionalised form of learning: These are categories that 
we seek to elaborate upon. 
Editorial
The word ‘crisis’ surrounds us incessantly, it has 
entered our everyday vocabulary. Currently, the 
financial and economic crisis that has unfolded as 
a result of the ‘housing bubble’ bust is one of global 
media’s favourites. For months—at least since late-
2008—headlines have featured the word ‘crisis’ at 
reliable frequencies. But global attention is in no way 
limited to the economic crisis: Whether a pandemic is 
imminent (think of SARS or the Swine Flu), a natural 
disaster strikes, or a humanitarian emergency occurs 
—the news is rife with the theme ‘crisis’. Should we 
really devote a whole issue of Schlossplatz3 to such 
an omnipresent issue? Does this term seriously need 
further explanation? One might be prone to think of 
the frequency with which ‘crisis’ is hammered into 
the attentive viewer’s or reader’s mind. Does the 
omnipresence of the word blunt us emotionally in the 
face of what actually matters? 
In the end, the human capacity to feel compassion for 
those falling victim to a crisis is limited and appar-
ently tends to blur with decreasing geographic prox-
imity. Therefore, a governmental crisis in the United 
Kingdom and its potential effects are perceived as 
more severe—judging by the amount of media atten-
tion—than the on-going humanitarian disaster in 
Darfur. As much as this remark could be understood 
to be cynical, it might also reveal the agenda-setting 
power of the media—and also how they influence our 
attention towards and our perception of crises. At the 
same time the omnipresence of ‘crisis’ renders the 
term somewhat abstract, even vague. To put it bluntly: 
If almost every event that is unforeseen and unfore-
seeable can be considered a crisis, then what, in fact, 
does ‘crisis’ really mean? Do we diminish the severity 
of what is happening in Darfur by equally labelling 
the decline of social democratic parties in Europe as 
the ‘crisis of social democracy’? 
Crisis * as an omnipresent part of our daily lives has become 
engrained in our mindsets. We should, however, not resort to 
apathy, but instead attempt to differentiate between those issues 
sold to us as crises. The new Schlossplatz3 issue shows how 
crises are managed in various examples and how they can serve 
as instances of learning.
2 Schlossplatz3
S
ch
lo
ss
pl
at
z3
An interview with Kurt Biedenkopf opens the set-
ting by getting into the characteristics of crises and 
the fine line between a crisis and a challenge. Why 
is this difference of importance? And is the global 
financial crisis handled correctly? Although the finan-
cial crisis is presently over-shadowing all other occur-
ring crises and emergencies, Ilona Kickbusch 
advocates giving the unfolding global health crisis 
the attention it deserves, especially as health crises 
could also get extremely costly for (Western) states 
and, more importantly, millions of people suffer or 
even die in their wake. 
Stanley Kober starts off a bloc on humanitar-
ian crisis and the controversial “responsibility to 
protect” doctrine. Should states intervene in other 
countries if these governments are not able or willing 
to protect their civilians? Or is intervention merely 
an excuse to invade a country? Donald Steinberg 
hence elaborates on the humanitarian necessity to 
intervene in order to prevent mass atrocities. In this 
context, Johannes Loh and Monika Rimmele 
draw up a case study of Sudan. Although a hot spot 
for decades—and not only the media-present Darfur 
conflict—the internatinal community was, and still 
is, not able to stop the fighting and bring peace and 
stability to Africa’s biggest country.
Another crisis receiving a lot of media attention is the 
global climate crisis. Ewout Doorman argues in 
favour of a re-orientation in global climate policy. To 
overcome the climate crisis, more prominent leaders 
should put environmental protection on their long-
term agenda. In Christopher Wynn’s opinion, 
disasters are not occurring naturally but are socially 
constructed. Disaster prevention and management 
could learn a lot on how to prevent natural crises from 
locals of the area in question. 
Arjen Boin and Paul ’t Hart describe how crises 
can be exploited for political gains. They argue that 
only true statesmen and -women recognise the oppor-
tunities crises bring along and use these for adapta-
tion and reform. 
Our last bloc focuses on financial and economic cri- 
ses. Frank Roselieb introduces us to the work of 
a crisis manager of a company or institution. Critical 
incidents like hacker attacks, product recalls or cor-
ruption allegations normally come unforeseen. How-
ever, there are ways to prepare a company for these 
incidents. As the media is gaining increasing influence 
over public opinion trends and consumers’ behaviour, 
a company lives and falls with its  reputation. Martin 
Dadiv Ledwon and Christoph Mielke explain 
how reputation risk management helps companies 
facing a crisis to overcome said emergency and to 
regain consumers’ trust and a positive reputation. But 
what if even the best crisis or reputation risk mana-
gement will not help anymore? How can firms survive 
the current financial crisis? Jörg Asmussen evalu-
ates the crisis management strategy of the German 
government and explains why the state’s interference 
and support is still needed in the business world.
We hope that you have an interesting read and are 
looking forward to your comments, criticicm and 
feedback. With warm regards from Berlin, 
the editors of Schlossplatz3
About us
Schlossplatz3 is a policy 
magazine run by a student 
team at the Hertie School 
of Governance ( HSoG ). In 
our studies, we come across 
myriad fascinating and  
cross-cutting topics. We pick 
one of them for Schlossplatz3 
and look at it from the  
perspectives of the public  
sector, the private sector  
and civil society—hence the 
superscript “3” in our  
name. 
*)   Annotations, see in red.
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Why Turning a Crisis into a Challenge Matters
The interview with Prof. Dr. Biedenkopf was conducted 
by Angela Konert and Monika Rimmele on 1 April 2009.
Schlossplatz3: When looking at newspapers every-
thing seems to be a crisis these days: financial cri-
sis, food crisis, oil price crisis, image crisis, health 
crisis... As having held various high-ranking posi-
tions in German politics, such as being the Prime 
Minister of Saxony, you most likely faced numer-
ous crises. What was the most challenging and far 
reaching crisis you experienced? 
Kurt Biedenkopf: From the perspective of many East 
Germans, German reunification constituted a deci-
sive turning-point in their lives and thus is a crisis 
and a challenge. There were two main reasons for 
this crisis: Firstly, Eastern Germany had to catch up 
rapidly in political, technological, industrial, and 
organisational terms. Secondly, people had to learn 
how to deal with, until then, unknown freedom. The 
overriding challenge was to help the people to over-
come this gap. Although people recognised reunifi-
cation as a crisis, it mainly was a huge chance with 
a clear goal. This goal was to live in a free, reunited 
Germany with everyone participating actively in the 
possibilities available in free societies. 
In 2007, you were assigned to mediate the dis-
pute between the Deutsche Bahn AG (Germany’s 
national railway company) and the trade unions. 
Did you perceive this dispute as a crisis? 
No, because the conflict was no crisis. A trade conflict 
is not a crisis, but a constitutional and legal procedure 
settling points of contention between two parties, 
the employees’ representatives and the corporation. I 
would not perceive this as a crisis, but a conflict. Not 
each conflict constitutes a crisis. 
So how would you then define a crisis?
A crisis is an outside intervention where the people 
concerned feel caught in a state of victimhood not 
knowing what happened. This brings me to an impor-
tant differentiation: When talking about a crisis, one 
feels as a victim. When talking about a challenge, one 
is an active designer with the opportunity to shape a 
different system. Therefore, I would say that the cur-
rent financial crisis should be regarded as a challenge. 
Is there a manual on how to most effectively 
manage crises?
This cannot be generalised. One always has to talk 
about a specific crisis. There is no abstract crisis man-
agement. Of course there are various preconditions, 
which have to be kept in mind. The most important 
one is that a crisis can only be managed if it is fully 
understood. However, this is difficult and cannot be 
taken for granted. For example, we do not understand 
the current financial crisis in all of its complexity; we 
merely make presumptions. Elites took risks they did 
not understand or even transferred them to third par-
ties who did not understand them either. This proved 
to be deadly for the trustworthiness of a system based 
on the handling and controlling of risks. We have 
plenty of far-reaching roots of this crisis which still 
remain mostly unexplored. We have to realise that for 
a system to function properly, freedom needs to be 
coupled with responsibility and control. 
Kurt Biedenkopf has overseen a number of challenges and crises 
throughout his career. To Schlossplatz3 he explains what constitutes 
a crisis, how it can be managed and how to understand the current 
Financial and Economic Crisis.
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  To come back to more political crises: Should they 
be managed differently than economic crises? 
As in every other crisis, it is essential in a political 
crisis to explore what exactly the issues at stake are. 
This can be tricky as all participants are likely to 
have different opinions of the crisis and the issues. 
Especially in conflicts with ideological and historical 
roots, reality is recognised differently by the parties 
involved. As long as there is no consensus about the 
roots of the conflict, its resolution is highly unlikely. 
Unresolved conflicts can develop into crises. They 
are often the expression of not taking advantage of 
opportunities. There is a general principle underlying 
that: The cost of solving a procrastinated problem 
rises to the second power of the time lost. To put it dif-
ferently: the longer one delays a problem, the higher 
the costs will be. There is a good German example 
to prove this principle. In the 1970s, it was realised 
that—for reasons of demographic development—our 
pension system would not be sustainable. It became 
clear that the younger generations would be less 
populous than their parents’ and grandparents’ gen-
erations. Fooling ourselves with cyclical fluctuations, 
the problem was not addressed and hence its political 
and structural solution delayed over decades. This 
could all have been avoided. Speaking generally, the 
breeding ground for an emerging crisis is the absence 
of adjustment processes. 
 
How do people react to crises?
People might perceive these adjustment processes 
as a threat to their well-being. One can observe that 
younger people are more inclined to accept changes 
due to a crisis. For older people, the threat to their 
known way of life dominates their perception. Poli-
ticians need to formulate a crisis as a challenge so 
people start to accept the crisis as a challenge and 
begin to participate in shaping it. 
 
Would you say that the majority of the people 
already perceive the current financial crisis as a 
challenge rather than a threat? 
No, such a shift does not happen that fast. Presently, 
the majority of the population perceives the financial 
crisis merely as a dark thundercloud far on the hori-
zon but not yet as an immediate threat. However, they 
start reacting by saving more of their regular income. 
For the economy this constitutes a problem mainly for 
the consumer industry. For an economic system based 
mainly on consumption and its continuous expansion, 
restrains in consumption must result in a crisis it can-
not handle. Therefore, we need to change the system 
so that it incorporates our current core problem: our 
economy cannot only grow but also shrink. We have 
to be able to cope with recessions and avoid that every 
economic downturn is acknowledged as a crisis. As 
we do not know how to cope with downturns and 
resulting distribution problems, governments have to 
adopt stimulus packages. This cannot be a long-term 
solution. We should rather accept that economies 
cannot grow indefinitely. Even if Germany’s GDP is 
shrinking by 5.2 % in 2009, we will merely fall to the 
level of 2006. We need to accept economic downturns 
as a period inevitably following growth. 
 
Prof. Biedenkopf, thank you very much for shar-
ing your thoughts with us.
“We need to change the system so 
that it incorporates our current core 
problem: our economy cannot only 
grow but also shrink. We have to be 
able to cope with recessions and avoid 
that every economic downturn is 
acknowledged as a crisis.”
Professor Dr. Kurt  
Biedenkopf holds degrees in 
Law and Economics and  
has habilitated in Civil Law and 
Trade, as well as Business  
and Labour Law at the Univer-
sity of Frankfurt/Main. For  
the Christian Democratic Union 
( CDU ), he was a member of 
the German Bundestag and 
the State Parliaments of North 
Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony. 
Between 1973 and 1977 he  
was the Secreatry General of 
the CDU and served as the  
Minister President of Saxony 
from 1990 until 2002. Since 
2003, Professor Biedenkopf 
has chaired the Board of  
Trustees of the Hertie School  
of Governance and since  
2006, he is the Honorary 
President of the Dresden Inter-
national University.
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Health crises are highly complex and fragmented in their nature.  
While there are popular issues such as HIV/AIDS that find a huge 
global resonance, the systemic risks relating to health care, prevention 
or health system finance are placed low on priority lists. Health is a 
question of social justice that might find more prominence in the  
light of the current Financial Crisis.
What crisis?  
In the context of global health the word ‘crisis’ has 
mostly been used when referring to a disease out-
break such as SARS in 2003 or swine flu in 2009, a 
natural and humanitarian disaster, such as the 2004 
Tsunami, or to global health challenges such as HIV/
AIDS, obesity or maternal mortality. More recently 
it has also been framed as a crisis of health systems 
and health care personnel and of global governance. 
The type of crisis that generates a response from the 
global community will tend to be one that also endan-
gers the health or the economic interests of the rich 
countries such as SARS, that has strong civil society 
and celebrity advocates around the world such as HIV/
AIDS or that evokes compassion such as the Tsunami. 
Systemic crisis – such as the financing of health 
systems in poor countries – are much more difficult 
to deal with and rarely generate sustained response. 
Most recently a new challenge has emerged for global 
health in view of the on-going global financial crisis 
—this could endanger global health progress and re -
inforce existing disease crisis. But it might provide an 
inroad to tackle the governance crisis. 
 
Is there a Global Health Crisis? 
by Ilona Kickbusch
Different crisis narratives 
In part, the difficulty of the discourse on crisis in 
global health lies in the fact that different under-
standings of global health will lead to different pri-
orities and involve quite different constituencies of 
interest. When taking a development perspective, the 
focus will tend to be the increasing health inequities 
between the winners and losers of globalisation, the 
chasm between what we know and what we do in rela-
tion to certain diseases, the unwillingness of the rich 
countries to meet their development commitments 
and the reluctance of some poor countries to consider 
the health of their people as a priority. HIV/AIDS, 
intellectual property, access to treatment, primary 
health care and the tragedy of Sub-Saharan Africa are 
the symbolic themes of this narrative. Human rights 
are at its centre. 
 
When taking a global governance perspective, the 
focus will tend to be on transnational health risks in 
the twenty-first century—such as tobacco or avian 
flu—and their control through a range of instruments 
such as the Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol or the International Health Regulations. The glo-
bal risk society blurs the dividing line between domes-
tic and foreign policy, between health and security 
and between health and other policies, such as trade. 
The origin of the risk often lies with the weakest link 
and the containment of the risk needs the support 
of the strong players. In order to be able to manage 
crisis—a disease outbreak for example—the global 
health governance system requires rules, trust, a level 
playing field for decision-making, skilled diplomacy 
and willingness to negotiate the collective provision 
of global public goods, as well as transparency and 
accountability. SARS, polio, avian flu and now swine 
flu are at the themes of this narrative. Health security 
is at its centre. 
 
The on-going global financial 
crisis could endanger global health 
progress and reinforce existing 
disease crisis.
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Professor Dr. Ilona Kick-
busch is a political scientist 
with a PhD from the University 
of Konstanz, Germany. Cur-
rently she is the Director of 
the Global Health Programme 
at the Graduate Institute of 
International and Development 
Studies, Geneva and has 
recently launched an initiative 
for the new policy platform 
Global Health Europe and for 
a Consortium on Global Health 
Diplomacy. She has also had  
a distinguished career with the 
World Health Organisation. 
From 1998 until 2003 she was 
the head of Yale University’s 
Global Health Division. 
Crisis as disease burden 
When framed as disease, the global health arena is 
full of crisis. Yet there is clearly a difference in the 
attention awarded to disease outbreaks or public 
health emergencies which endanger the developed 
world – such as the recent swine flu outbreak in April 
2009 – compared to the consideration given to persis-
tent problems such as HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuber-
culosis which reside mainly in developing countries. 
Financial resources for global health have increased 
significantly in the past decade but tough competi-
tion for political attention and money persists in the 
disease arena, particularly now, as there can be the 
danger of funds drying up in view of the financial 
crisis. This reinforces the tendency in a global media 
society to declare a crisis. 
 
Setting priorities is difficult. The UN Millennium 
Development Goals attempted to set health priorities 
—child health, maternal health and HIV/AIDS—but 
these have been challenged repeatedly because they 
do not address the threat of chronic diseases which 
kill an increasing number of people in developing 
countries. There never seems to be enough political 
will or development aid to combat the many diseases 
which could be prevented or treated despite the fact 
that a range of new organisations have been created 
to address some of them—such as the Global Fund on 
Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria or UNAIDS. There is 
also criticism that the focus on the ‘big three’ leads to 
the neglect of other tropical diseases endemic in the 
developing world (such as hook worm, Chagas dis-
ease or trachoma) even though together they cause a 
comparably high global disease burden. Even simple 
interventions like bed nets to protect against malaria 
do not reach the poorest that need them most.  
 
There is a shift at present from the focus on disease cri-
sis. Despite the rapid expansion of some disease spe-
cific programmes—such as AIDS treatment and HIV 
disease management—the general health systems in 
developing countries have remained under-funded 
and there is a significant lack of health workers. Today 
many health systems in developing countries are at a 
breaking point—this has fuelled the debate between 
advocates of ‘vertical’, disease-specific health pro-
grammes such as for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria and the ‘horizontal’ approach which focuses 
on the strengthening of general health systems. The 
disease crisis is now framed as a health systems 
crisis which is the result of the combined impact of 
structural adjustment, civil wars, disasters, the lack 
of a tax base for health investment, the vertical focus 
of many of the donor-based programmes and some-
times the lack of interest in health by the political 
elite of poor countries. Increasingly the attention 
of the international health community is moving to 
deal with more systemic crisis: the workforce crisis, 
the access to medicines crisis, the crisis of primary 
health care.  
The difficulty of the discourse on 
crisis in global health lies in the 
fact that different understandings 
of global health lead to different 
priorities and involve quite different 
constituencies of interest.
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Crisis as poverty and social injustice 
Many would argue that the never-ending disease 
crises are but a symptom of a much larger crisis of 
inequality and asymmetry of power. The global health 
crisis must be understood as a crisis of poverty and 
of extreme inequality and exclusion. This view is 
reinforced by the debate on the impact of the present 
financial crisis on global health. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) convened a high level consulta-
tion in January 2009 not only to build awareness of 
the ways in which an economic downturn may affect 
health spending, health services, health-seeking 
behaviour and health outcomes but also to make the 
case for sustaining investments in health and mitigat-
ing the impact of the crisis. The WHO argues that “the 
grave human crisis that is already happening” may 
get even worse and the poorest will be affected most 
through causes which are not of their own making. 
Already the current food crisis has been estimated as 
being responsible for pushing more than 100 million 
people back into poverty—with serious consequences 
for health outcomes and nutritional status.  
 
The recent report by the WHO Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health states bluntly: “Social injus-
tice kills people.” The report draws attention to the 
deeper social structures and processes which produce 
inequity and promote the unfair distribution of and 
access to power, wealth and other necessary social 
resources. It asks the question: “Why treat people if 
you don’t address what makes them sick?” A girl born 
today can expect to live for more than 80 years if she is 
born in some countries—but less than 45 years if she 
is born in others. There are also dramatic differences 
in health within countries. The commission report 
comes at a time when the financial crisis has provoked 
an examination of the values that have been dominant 
in the global arena. The debate on the present crisis 
in global health should therefore aim to be transfor-
mative. The solution will not be more money. What 
is rather needed is a willingness to question some of 
the prevailing vertical approaches in global health, 
strengthen mechanisms of global health governance, 
reassess development aid and endorse a greater focus 
on social justice.
The UN Millennium Development 
Goals attempted to set health 
priorities—child health, maternal 
health and HIV/AIDS—but these 
have been challenged repeatedly 
because they do not address the 
threat of chronic diseases which kill 
an increasing number of people in 
developing countries.
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Crisis management is a frequently 
used as euphemism for outside 
intervention.
Crisis management is a frequently used euphemism 
for external intervention. After all, the situation in 
a country does not attract the attention of outsiders 
if it is successfully handled as a domestic matter. 
Only when the crisis spills over borders or when the 
situation inside a country provokes moral outrage 
do outsiders feel a need to intervene—to manage the 
crisis. In recent years, “responsibility to protect” has 
become a spur to intervention. It has mainly emerged 
from two historical junctures. The first of these is the 
Holocaust that would “never again” be allowed to hap- 
pen. Pursuant to the goal to prevent further geno-
cides, states were put under an obligation to prevent 
genocide. The second juncture was the end of the Cold 
War. Whatever was said about preventing genocide 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, nobody 
wanted to risk another global war. In addition, inter-
ventions were often viewed as politically motivated 
efforts in order to gain an advantage vis-à-vis the 
other side. Neither side could take the sincerity of the 
other seriously.
 
As the Cold War had ended, the first serious challenge 
came with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Rus-
sia and China did not object when the United States 
assembled an international force to protect Saudi 
Arabia and then freed Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. 
President George H.W. Bush famously spoke of a 
new international order in which the United Nations 
The Perils of Intervention  
 
by Stanley Kober 
Especially after the end of the Cold War, the “responsibility to 
protect” concept began enjoying special attention. Stanley Kober 
seriously doubts if appropriately. The author does not only provide 
historical evidence when the “responsibility to protect” concept 
has been used as an excuse for military intervention, but also 
raises the adequate question about the disastrous consequences 
of failed interventions. 
would act to prevent aggression, in contrast to the 
divisions that paralysed it during the Cold War. Yet, 
the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia brought 
old divisions back to the forefront: the Kosovo Crisis 
in particular raised serious questions about interven-
tion.
Who decides about intervention? According to the 
UN Charter, intervention should be authorised by the 
Security Council. However, given its internal divi-
sion, agreement was impossible. The NATO military 
campaign was acknowledged to be illegal even by its 
defenders. Yet, these defenders nevertheless argued 
that it was legitimate because of the severity of the 
human rights violations and the responsibility to 
protect the people from the atrocities committed. The 
Fall 2009 · Issue Seven  9
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Interventions were often viewed as 
politically motivated efforts in order 
to gain an advantage vis-à-vis the 
other side.
Stanley Kober is a Research 
Fellow in Foreign Policy  
Studies at the CATO Institute 
in Washington, DC. He is 
a graduate of Georgetown 
University’s School of Foreign 
Service and received his  
PhD from the Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy at  
Tufts University. He has  
lectured in the United States 
and abroad, and his work  
has appeared in Foreign 
Policy, International Affairs 
(London), the New York Times,  
Washington Post, and the  
Wall Street Journal. Kober 
previously worked on Soviet 
and defense issues at  
SRI International, the Center 
for Naval Analyses, and  
the Hudson Institute.
problem with that argument is that anyone can invoke 
it to justify intervention. Indeed, in the 1930s Adolf 
Hitler used the treatment of the Sudeten Germans 
as an excuse to pry territory from Czechoslovakia. 
Substantively providing the discursive grounds for 
the ethnic cleansing rationale for intervention in 
Kosovo, Hitler complained that people were being 
expelled from their villages. In effect, he was argu-
ing that Germany had a “responsibility” to protect 
them. Britain and France regarded his arguments as 
sufficiently legitimate and hence abandoned the legal 
commitments they had made in Locarno in 1925. 
The intervention in Kosovo possibly marks the begin-
ning of the end of the post-Cold War world. As the 
Cold War had not led to a world war, and as Russia 
was weakened subsequently, the dangers of a new 
global division were largely ignored, just as they were 
before the First World War. When Austria delivered its 
ultimatum to Serbia, it did not expect Russia would 
come to Serbia’s defence. Russia was still recovering 
from its defeat in the war against Japan, and it had 
not intervened in the on-going bloody Balkan wars. 
But Russia decided that, in spite of its weakness, its 
 honour mandated it to protect the Serbs. So one action 
led to another and the world was plunged into a ter-
rible war; the Balkan wars that preceded it, terrible as 
they were, live in its shadow.
 
The veto in the UN Security Council was meant to 
prevent that situation from occurring again. No mat-
ter how bad a situation might be, if the major powers 
line up on opposite sides, there is the potential for a 
much worse catastrophe. If one side misjudges the 
intentions of its opponent, intervention to prevent a 
local atrocity could lead once again to a major confla-
gration. And although that concern has been widely 
dismissed since the end of the Cold War, that very 
complacency is an eerie re-play of the confidence that 
existed a century ago—that the absence of major war 
in Europe for such a long time, combined with the ties 
of commerce and investment that increasingly knit 
the countries of Europe together, meant that another 
major war could not occur.
 
Wall Street, according to a popular saying, climbs 
a wall of worry. When people stop worrying, when 
they become too confident, disaster strikes. During 
the Cold War we worried about escalation, and we 
avoided major war. If history teaches anything, it 
should remind us of underestimating the risks of war. 
Moreover, even during the Cold War, interventions 
that occurred in the absence of great power agree-
ment in the Security Council tended to fail miserably.
 
Americans tend to think foremost of Vietnam. When 
Congress overwhelmingly approved the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution nobody imagined the war would end so 
badly. The Vietnam War raises questions about the 
10 Schlossplatz3
Can you be so sure your intervention 
will succeed? What if it doesn’t? Could 
you make a bad situation worse?
“responsibility to protect” concept since many of the 
people who supported intervention in the Balkans 
opposed the American effort in Vietnam. But what 
was the difference? If Slobodan Milosevic’s national-
ism was so evil, wasn’t then Ho Chi Minh’s national-
ism similarly evil? Why was the tragedy of ethnic 
cleansing worse than the plight of the boat people? If 
the people of Kosovo were entitled to protection, why 
not the people of South Vietnam? And the American 
experience in Vietnam provides one final, cautionary 
note for those who would favour intervention. Can 
you be so sure your intervention will succeed? What 
if it doesn’t? Could you make a bad situation worse? 
The American defeat in Vietnam was unexpected—
certainly by us. And the consequences for the Viet-
namese were tragic. But the consequences for the 
Cambodians were, if anything, even worse.
 
We wanted to protect; we tried very hard. But we failed. 
Did we make the situation worse as a result? If we 
had not intervened, would the Cambodians have been 
spared genocide? There is no way to know. But the 
question should haunt those who favour intervention. 
How can you be sure your intervention will succeed? 
And will you make the situation worse if your inter-
vention fails?
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As each new conflict appears in the in-boxes of 
policy-makers, the first question is whether this par-
ticular crisis warrants international engagement. The 
answer is a measure of “political will”, a complex cal-
culation of national security, political, economic and 
diplomatic interests, moral values, public support for 
action, and capacity for effective engagement—all fil-
tered through policy-makers’ individual perspectives. 
But there is one set of issues where engagement is—at 
least in principle—pre-ordained. Under the concept 
of “responsibility to protect”, which was unanimously 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, world 
leaders pledged to take national and collective action 
to prevent and stop genocide, crimes against human-
ity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Responsibility 
to protect commits national leaders to safeguard 
their population from mass atrocities, and if they are 
unable or unwilling to do so, it commits the interna-
tional community to assume the burden. 
For several years, the concept lay essentially dormant, 
especially as resentment grew against western inter-
vention and unilateralism, especially from the Bush 
administration. A “coalition of the unwilling”, includ-
ing India, Egypt, Pakistan and South Africa, even 
suggested that the world had never really endorsed 
Stopping Mass Atrocities: 
Responsibility to Protect in Action  
 
by Donald Steinberg
A general consensus on humanitarian intervention is necessary  
to prevent mass atrocities. Donald Steinberg shows, by drawing 
up four cases, how global principles could emerge that help to  
assume the “responsibility to protect” doctrine where appropriate.
There is one set of issues where 
engagement is—at least in principle—
pre-ordained.
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Responsibility to protect commits 
national leaders to safeguard their 
population from mass atrocities.  
If the national leaders are unable or 
unwilling to do so, it commits the 
international community to assume 
the burden.
Donald Steinberg serves 
as Deputy President for Policy  
at the International Crisis 
Group. He has previously 
served as Special Assistant for 
African affairs to President 
Clinton and as U.S. Ambassa-
dor to Angola.
the concept. By contrast, the year 2008 saw increased 
application of this concept to conflict prevention and 
resolution. Not only were structures for early warning, 
preventative diplomacy and early response adopted 
within the United Nations, governments and regional 
organisations, but the concept was increasingly used 
as a lens for viewing emerging crises. Its applica-
tion—or in some cases misapplication—in Kenya, 
Burma, Georgia, and Zimbabwe provided fascinating, 
although not entirely consistent, lessons. 
 
When failed elections in Kenya were followed by 
vicious inter-ethnic riots in January 2008, interna-
tional actors asked if we were seeing the first stages of 
Rwanda-style genocide, and took pre-emptive action. 
The burning of the church in Eldoret with three dozen 
Kikuyus inside, the history of violence in the Rift 
Valley, and the hate speech prevalent among Kikuyus, 
Kalenjins, Luos and Luhyas moved this from the con-
text of usual post-electoral conflicts and put it squarely 
into the realm of the “responsibility to protect” 
stage. Then-African Union (AU) chairperson John 
Kufuor, Desmond Tutu, and others soon descended 
on Nairobi. The AU empowered former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan to help resolve the crisis. He and 
his team adopted a sophisticated approach to stop the 
escalating violence and created a framework and a 
national dialogue to address the underlying roots of 
the conflict, including ethnic divides, disempower-
ment, and inequitable distribution of wealth and land. 
A power-sharing government was established and 
disaster averted. Those suggesting that responsibility 
to protect is a tool of the West should note that the 
intervention was designed and negotiated by Ghana-
ians, South Africans, Mozambicans and Tanzanians. 
In Burma, the junta’s first reaction in May 2008 to the 
worst natural disaster in the country’s recorded his-
tory—Cyclone Nargis—was to keep out desperately 
needed foreign aid. It failed to launch a substantial 
relief operation and selectively blocked international 
access to the worst-affected areas. It assured the 
world everything was under control while media were 
showing pictures of on-going deaths and suffering. 
Quickly, many asked if these actions were a crime 
against humanity, justifying coercive international 
action. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, 
the father of “humanitarian intervention”, argued 
that if deaths resulted from the junta’s intransigence 
to allow aid, this could invoke intervention. While his 
proposal for a UN Security Council resolution was 
rejected by China, Russia, and others, the debate gave 
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clarity to international outrage. China and Burma’s 
ASEAN friends were embarrassed, and warned the 
junta that without changes, they might not be able 
to forestall external intervention. Within weeks, the 
junta welcomed aid channelled through regional 
actors and established an unprecedented aid co-ordi-
nation mechanism. Soon after, the UN called the situ-
ation in Burma “a normal relief and recovery effort”.
 
When Russian troops crossed into South Ossetia and 
then Georgia in August 2008, Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin invoked responsibility to protect, arguing that 
the actions were designed to prevent genocide against 
South Ossetians. Almost in unison, the international 
community rejected this assertion as a diplomatic 
shell-game. Critics pointed out that responsibility to 
protect refers to a government’s duty to protect popu-
lations within its own borders, not its citizens abroad. 
They noted that Russia failed to make the case that the 
threat to South Ossetians was of a nature and scale 
as to legitimise military force. Further, they pointed 
out that Russia’s action was likely motivated more 
by its desire to control South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
dismantle Georgia’s military, scuttle Georgia’s NATO 
ambitions and warn other former Soviet republics. 
They also rejected Russian claims because its diplo-
mats never sought UN Security Council approval for 
military intervention as required. In sum, the broad 
rejection of Russia’s claims helped set the strict 
parameters for the concept’s application.
As Zimbabwe descended into humanitarian, eco-
nomic, and political crisis during 2008, Kenyan Prime 
Minister Raila Odinga, Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
and others called for forceful international action 
in responsibility-to-protect terms. Some argued that 
mass atrocity crimes were already being committed, 
citing organised violence against regime opponents. 
Others claimed that Mugabe’s regime was showing 
“reckless indifference” to humanitarian suffering and 
was complicit in deaths resulting from cholera and 
starvation. But Zimbabwe displays disturbing limits 
on the use of responsibility to protect, especially 
absent common support from the international/
regional actors. Even those supporting coercive action 
acknowledged this was not possible without support 
of Zimbabwe’s neighbours, especially South Africa, 
or the UN Security Council. Further, coercive military 
action can do little to stop cholera, feed starving 
populations, return displaced persons, and rebuild 
hospitals, especially if faced with local armed resis-
tance. Mugabe and his regime counted on regional 
negotiator Thabo Mbeki and regional leaders to 
prevent forceful political, diplomatic, humanitarian 
and economic measures. The opposition’s decision 
in January 2009 to join a power-sharing government 
changed the situation, but it is nonetheless disturb-
ing that invoking “responsibility to protect” could not 
force flexibility or accommodation from Mugabe and 
company. 
These four cases might be judged as three steps for-
ward, one step back. Still, fundamental steps must 
translate “responsibility to protect” into effective 
action against mass atrocities. Advocates must seek 
global consensus, resist backsliding, and enshrine 
its principles in relevant international, regional and 
national institutions. They must view the concept 
neither too narrowly as only about military interven-
tion, nor too widely as about all human security issues. 
They must build capacity in international institutions, 
governments, and civil society: civilian and military, 
preventive and reactive. And they must generate 
political will to address new conflicts. The agenda 
is daunting, but the stakes are too high to let it pass. 
Advocates must seek global 
consensus, resist backsliding, and 
enshrine its principles in relevant 
international, regional and national 
institutions.
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Failed Crisis Management 
in a Failed State?
by Johannes Loh and Monika Rimmele
Sudan, and particularly the Darfur region, have been crisis hot spots 
for several decades. Previous interventions have not brought the 
desired success. Instead, the people living in the respective regions 
are caught in a complex net of conflicts over tribal rivalries,  
religion and resources.
With a precarious and uncertain prospect in Darfur, a 
non-existing administrative infrastructure and a very 
tense security situation in Southern Sudan, the world 
is witnessing abysmal crisis management by the inter-
national community in Darfur and facing enormous 
challenges for national and international actors with 
regard to other hot spots in the country.
Sudan, Africa’s largest country, lies in one of the most 
unstable regions in the world, sharing mostly porous 
borders with its eight neighbouring countries. It is 
devastated by Africa’s longest civil war which raged 
between Northern and Southern Sudan from 1955 to 
1972 and from 1983 to 2005. Sudan led the Failed State 
Index in 2006 and 2007, now ranking second in the 
2008 Index after Somalia. A complex web of interrelat-
ing social, political and economic factors makes the 
situation in Sudan a nightmare for its citizens but also 
for the “crisis managers” in the Security Council.
A permanently failed state?
Sudan has been in near constant conflict since its 
independence in 1956. In all its conflicts, the actors 
are extremely splintered. In the Upper Nile region 
alone, for instance, are more than a dozen militias 
fighting in changing alliances against the govern-
ment or Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A), South Sudan’s dominating party,. Marina 
Peter of the Sudan Economic Forum (SEF) described 
the security situation as a “chronic humanitarian 
crisis with multi-dimensional conflict status”. There 
are several overlaying, interrelated conflicts in Sudan: 
The dominating North-South conflict
Numerous local, mainly traditional conflicts in the 
different regions
Centre-periphery conflicts between the central region 
of Khartoum and e.g. Darfur, the Upper Nile region, 
and the Beja Congress in the East
At the centre of all conflicts are the absence of state 
legitimacy and the extremely fragile statehood in 
most parts of Sudan. The post-colonial state con-
struction is until this day not yet anchored in the very 
traditional Sudanese tribal society. Already since the 
British colonial rule, all political and financial atten-
tion has been on the centre around Khartoum. Periph-
ery regions, such as Southern Sudan and Darfur, have 
been systematically neglected and marginalised. 
The ground for conflict was prepared once outlying 
regions felt increasingly repressed by the political 
elite of Khartoum. When the Islamisation of Sudan 
implemented Sharia law and introduced Arabic as 
official language, the Christian and Animist minori-
“There will not be any international 
military intervention in Darfur as 
long as I am in power.”
Omer Al Bashir (June, 2006) 
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months after the violence had started in Darfur. From 
the very beginning, the discourse around an interna-
tional response in Darfur centred on the questions 
whether it would be enough to call upon the Suda-
nese government to do more to protect the people of 
Darfur or whether it was the Security Council’s 
responsibility to act on grounds of the “responsibil-
ity to protect” doctrine. Looking back at the slow and 
problem-laden deployment of the UNAMID mission, 
the international community’s crisis management 
was acceptable with respect to fighting the symptoms 
(successful delivery of humanitarian aid) but abysmal 
with respect to its responsibility to protecting inno-
cent citizens (establishment of basic security and sta-
bility). However, in light of the “never again” promise 
following the Rwandan Genocide, international 
action can best be described as too hesitant. Some 
critics though even accuse it of being absent. A senior 
UN official described the lack of a forthcoming UN 
intervention colourfully by noting: “The international 
community is keeping people alive with humanitar-
ian assistance until they are massacred”. 
Effective international involvement in Darfur and 
Southern Sudan, including the establishment of basic 
security and humanitarian aid, should have the high-
est priority as the central government in Khartoum 
is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens or 
provide them with the basic necessities. But apart 
from providing humanitarian aid, the international 
community has no success story to tell. This is on 
the one hand due to the inability of the international 
community to find a common stance and on the other 
ties in the South saw their traditional way of life 
endangered. The discovery of substantial oil reserves 
in the South in the 1970s further worsened the already 
precarious security situation in Sudan. The South, 
fearing that the North would keep the oil revenues for 
itself, resumed the fight for its autonomy. These days, 
advancing desertification, especially in Darfur, threat-
ens the already meagre base for agriculture and hence 
fires tribal conflicts for scarce fertile lands and water. 
The conflict in Darfur, which broke out in February 
2003, is one of the world’s worst on-going conflicts, 
with devastating consequences for the civilian popu-
lation. Numbers of civilian casualties are estimated to 
be between 200,000 and 400,000. About 2.6 million 
Darfuri are internally displaced, around 200,000 fled 
over the border to eastern Chad. It is estimated that a 
total of 4.72 million Darfuri are affected by the con-
flict—with a population of only six million people this 
roughly represents two thirds of the entire population. 
OCHA Sudan states that Darfur is “the world’s larg-
est humanitarian operation” which developed from 
traditional relief into an entire humanitarian industry.
Failed crisis management—(n)ever again?
The international community reacted rather hesi-
tantly to first reports about atrocities in and around 
Darfur. Reports by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights raised first suspicions in March 2003 that “a 
clear policy of ethnic cleansing” targeted at African 
tribes in Darfur might be pursued by the Janjaweed 
militia. However, at that time, Darfur was not on 
the international agenda and evidence was based on 
second-hand reports. Throughout 2003, the interna-
tional reaction was restricted to delivering humani-
tarian aid and overall remarkably invisible. By the 
time the Security Council had taken up the issue in 
March 2004, the (Arab) Janjaweed militia—supported 
by the Sudanese government—had already launched 
major offensives where killings, mass rapes, the burn-
ing of villages and forced displacement were common. 
The first explicit Security Council Resolution on the 
situation in Darfur was passed only in July 2004—17 
“The international community 
is keeping people alive with 
humanitarian assistance until they 
are massacred.”
Senior UN official (March, 2006)
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hand due to the cunning Sudanese manipulations 
of international powers. Sudan’s leaders, in par-
ticular President Al-Bashir, understand international 
dynamics well and applied stalling tactics like news 
blackouts, varying visa restrictions for journalists and 
humanitarian actors but also successfully blamed the 
violence in Darfur on inter-tribal conflicts.
The back and forth of negotiations without visible 
progress on the ground—the AU mission was too 
limited in force and on top of that insufficiently 
equipped—led to growing frustration among UN 
officials and aid agencies. It was seen as a big success, 
when Sudan finally gave its consent to an AU/UN 
hybrid-mission (UNAMID) in 2007.  UNAMID was des- 
ignated to consist of 19,555 military and 6,432 police 
personnel. However, to the disap pointment of all 
parties, the deployment of UNAMID was delayed for 
months and is still not fully deployed (troop strength 
stands at 13,286 military and 2,936 police person-nel 
as of May 2009). Despite the explicit mandate to ensure 
the protection of civilians, UNAMID commanders are 
required to obtain  Khartoum’s consent for basically 
any troop movement. Therefore the effectiveness of 
UNAMID’s protection for the civilian population can 
be called into serious doubt. 
An additional problem is that Western powers were, 
and still are, hesitant to deploy own armed forces 
for UNAMID. What is lacking is real political and 
military commitment to create the conditions under 
which a lasting peace and, subsequently, the basis for 
a sustainable political, military and developmental 
infrastructure can be laid.
Concluding one can say that the record for the inter-
national community is startling. The Security Council 
shied away from effective intervention which led to 
a delayed and weak response. The resulting peace-
keeping operations UNMIS, AMIS and UNAMID 
were weak and restricted in operability. The pres-
sure on the Sudanese Government turned out to be 
fragmented and thus ineffective, leading to a wide 
discrepancy between rhetoric and action. All actors 
have fallen prey to political gaming by Sudan’s Presi-
dent Al-Bashir and his government—at the cost of the 
suffering population.
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“The international community 
must be prepared to take swift and 
appropriate action (…) which may 
include military action.”
Kofi Annan (2004) 
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Welcome to Carbon Space...
and the Climate Crisis
 
by Ewout Doorman 
Ewout Doorman argues in favour of a re-orientation in global 
climate policy. Climate change as a crisis could likely be 
assuaged if a greater sense of urgency is assumed and if actions 
follow swiftly.
Carbon space is just about my favourite climate 
concept. It does not merely sound adventurous and 
futuristic, but also helps us to visualise an elusive 
climate crisis we should be preventing. Carbon 
space refers to the amount of CO2 the atmosphere 
can absorb before the climate change will start to 
have catastrophic consequences. China and other 
developing countries use the term to point out that 
developed countries have so far used more than their 
“fair share” of the carbon space. I like to use the term 
as it enhances my understanding of climate change 
and as it concretises this elusive phenomenon.
 
Carbon space, like normal space, is limited. These 
limits are not undisputed. Yet, reports issued by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
give us a good impression of where these limits may 
lie. The panel asserts that we will need to keep carbon 
concentrations in the atmosphere between 350 and 
450 parts per million (ppm) if we are to have a 50 % 
chance to keep global warming below two degrees. 
We are currently at 386 ppm. This means that we are 
already where we can afford to be. However, we will 
most likely not remain there. There are numerous 
scenarios that describe future developments in atmo-
spheric CO2 concentrations. If we continue business-
as-usual, we will face carbon concentrations of 900 
ppm by 2100. This illustrates the dimension of the 
problem quite well.  
 
Two degrees of global warming is the magic number, 
as scientists estimate that this is the maximum we 
can adapt to. This adaption, however, will not be 
painless. Estimates indicate that a two-degree rise in 
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the global average temperature will already lead to 0.4 
to 1.7 billion people suffering from increased water 
stress as well as increased mortality due to storms, 
heat waves and droughts. And these consequences are 
mild compared to what we can expect from further 
temperature rises: if temperatures increase between 
two to three degrees, 20 to 30 % of all species will 
be at increasing risk of extinction, and there will be 
widespread coral mortality and significant loss of the 
Amazon rainforest. Above three degrees the global 
food production will decline, which will affect many 
regions severely. Production in some African coun-
tries may fall by 50 % as early as 2020.
 
But back to carbon space. This short mental excur-
sion reveals that we are already on the way to using 
far more carbon space than we can afford to. We can 
continue doing this for a while but this will have con-
sequences. Loading the world with a type of carbon 
debt is similar to loading a bank with toxic loans in 
the sense that it will inevitably lead to a crisis—in this 
If temperatures increase between two 
to three degrees, 20 to 30 % of all  
species will be at increasing risk of  
extinction, and there will be wide-
spread coral mortality and significant 
loss of the Amazon rainforest.  
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case a climate crisis. Such a climate crisis is bad news. 
There will be no one to bail us out and there will not 
be any hope that the crisis will automatically disap-
pear after a couple of years or decades. There will be 
no way to mitigate this crisis quickly because of the 
long atmospheric lifetime of most greenhouse gases. 
The effect of this lifespan is that global temperatures 
continue to rise until 2050 even if emissions peak 
today. Emissions are not peaking today and it seems 
unlikely that they will decrease anytime soon.
 
The good news about the climate crisis is that we can 
avoid it. Even better news is that avoiding it will not 
even be that expensive! That is, of course, if all the 
cost efficient mitigation options such as switching 
to LEDs, improving the aerodynamics of cars and 
waste recycling are implemented. These cost-saving 
options would need to be complemented by some 
relatively cheap options such as onshore wind energy 
plants and reduced deforestation. For such a scenario, 
a McKinsey study estimates the costs of these options 
amount to only 5.5 % of global GDP by 2050. A lot of 
money, but only a fraction of the costs we can expect 
to incur if we do not act. 
 
The bad news is that we appear to be wasting our 
opportunities in spite of them being feasible and 
affordable. I first attended a negotiation session of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) in Bonn in spring 2009. It 
struck me that the 192 countries party to the UNFCCC 
appear to be exclusively preoccupied with short-term 
economic gains. That is: who gets what and who 
pays what. Each country is evidently aware of the 
distributional effects of the new regime and, hence, 
is keen on not paying beyond their fair share of the 
burden. Such concerns about costs and equity are 
understandable and justified and I should not have 
expected anything else. I can, however, not help but 
get the impression that these national interests carry 
too much weight and thus overshadow the common 
interest in an adequate and sustainable agreement. 
 
I have come to the conclusion that we will not only 
need adequate funding, sound science and intel-
ligent and equitable emissions trading systems and 
the like to prevent this crisis. What is needed, even 
after countless reports, a movie and a Nobel Peace 
Prize, is a greater sense of urgency. Climate Change 
is a counter-intuitive phenomenon that merely exists 
in presentations, on paper and in the future. These 
characteristics almost guarantee a lack of political 
attention and will. What is needed is greater aware-
ness of the urgency of this problem. We need more 
long-term and more integrated thinking. We need 
parties to carefully weigh the short-term costs of 
emission reductions and adaptation measures with 
the long-term costs of a global climate crisis. 
Ewout Doorman is Pro-
gramme Assistant for the 
Diplomacy Programme  
at the Institute for Environ-
mental Security focusing  
on climate change and  
security issues. He holds a 
Master in International  
Relations from the Univer- 
sity of Groningen in the  
Netherlands. He worked on 
energy and environment  
policy as an intern for GLOBE 
Europe and for the Delegation 
of the European Commis- 
sion to the United States in 
Washington, DC.
Estimates indicate that a two-degree 
rise in the global average temperature 
will already lead to 0.4 to 1.7 billion 
people suffering from increased  
water stress as well as increased mor- 
tality due to storms, heat waves  
and droughts.
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The Dangerous Game of Crisis Exploitation 
by Arjen Boin and Paul ’t Hart
Arjen Boin and Paul ’t Hart show how crises can be exploited  
for political gains by smart leaders. By using suitable rhetoric 
and playing the ‘blame game’, these leaders can emerge as 
victorious crisis managers. Yet, the strategy of crisis exploitation 
bears inherent risks.
Crises typically create major opportunities for change. 
The very occurrence of a crisis or disaster signals that 
existing policies and institutions failed to protect a 
society against external or internal threats. Adapta-
tion then seems necessary: crises invite leaders to act 
and get things done. They open political windows of 
opportunity for new ideas and policies, for a new way 
of working. A society—its institutions, policies and 
citizens—can thus emerge stronger from a trauma-
tising experience.
The really big and scary crises offer unique opportuni-
ties for political exploitation. When a crisis has a truly 
dislocating effect—delegitimising entire institutions 
or rendering obsolete long-standing policies— leaders 
can redesign and rebuild the institutional landscape. 
Changes that would be politically impossible in nor-
mal times are suddenly required and expected. 
Political leaders then face an intriguing set of chal-
lenges. They must first of all ensure that they them-
selves and the governments or organisations they lead 
come to be seen as part of the solution, not as part of 
The very occurrence of a crisis or 
disaster signals that existing policies 
and institutions failed.
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the problems that caused the crisis in the first place. 
This requires astute management of the account-
ability process—now commonly known as the ‘blame 
game’—that crises trigger. They must also act pru-
dently to reconsider and adjust existing policies and 
institutions to the new realities—including altered 
public perceptions and strong public emotions—that 
crises create. And finally, to the extent that they want 
to exploit the opportunities for ‘creative destruc-
tion’ that crises offer, they need to infuse the crisis-
induced discussions about ‘never again’ and ‘learning 
the lessons’ with the political agenda they brought 
into office, since “you never want a serious crisis to go 
to waste” (Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s chief 
of staff ).
Some leaders are particularly adept at crisis exploi-
tation. Franklin Roosevelt, Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan were all masters of this craft. On 
the wings of recession, they transformed economic 
policy and the role of the state. Consistently forward-
ing a distinct philosophy of change, they emerged 
from these long crisis periods as true statesmen and 
-women.
Some leaders savour the prospect of change so deeply 
they will seek to create a sense of urgency, calculating 
that a deep crisis will temporarily relieve the many 
constraints of ‘government as usual’. Political scien-
tist Murray Edelman observed decades ago that: “Any 
government that prides itself on its ability to manage 
crises is sure to find crises to manage, and crisis 
management is always available as a way to mobilise 
public support.” 
In his efforts to get a stimulus bill passed, President 
Obama upped the crisis rhetoric to sustain momen-
tum. If senators do not act immediately, the President 
warned, the current crisis could turn into a catastro-
phe. Every day of political bickering will cost more 
jobs, more foreclosures, and more sorrow. A political 
contest of ideas and interests was thus framed as 
a moral imperative—just like George W. Bush did 
after 9/11. In both instances, the political space for 
constructive opposition to the leader’s agenda was 
effectively and severely constrained. Like the Patriot 
Act, the stimulus package sailed through Congress, 
both initiating fundamental, hard-to-reverse reforms 
conceived and implemented at a pace that would 
astound even Roosevelt. 
In another example of crisis exploitation, Australia’s 
Labour Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was quick to pub-
lish a major essay that declared the ‘neo-liberalism’ 
of his main political adversaries dead and buried. To 
him, the global crisis means that the nation state and 
social democracy are back in business. Almost three 
decades after Reagan uttered his famous line that 
government is not the solution but the problem, the 
tables can be turned, says Rudd. The market has prob-
lems, government brings the solution. He received 
robust criticism for taking this line, but got what he 
wanted: control of the agenda of the debate, moving 
attention away from the big gambles taken by his 
government in cobbling together a 46 billion dollar 
stimulus package.
Crisis exploitation is politically tempting, but may 
compromise prudence in policy-making and stifle 
democratic deliberation. In their rush to seize the 
political momentum, these leaders are ignoring an 
essential lesson of past crises: quick and big crisis 
responses tend to backfire. Crisis-induced reforms 
often produce reform-induced crises. Reforms crafted 
in haste address symptoms rather than causes, focus 
on the short-term rather than the longer term, and 
rarely capture the wisdom of those who know best 
(those who have to deliver it). 
Capitalising on crisis unleashes a momentum that 
is hard to control. More specifically, a crisis triggers 
two dangerous reflexes that ultimately undermine the 
chances of the proposed reform. 
Imposing hasty crisis measures 
negates the intelligence of 
democracy: the exploring  
and reconsidering, bargaining  
and learning produced by 
pluralistic deliberation.
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First, in the rush to seize the momentum crisis leaders 
tend to impose self-defeating deadlines. Sober analy-
sis and calm reflection are crowded out by partisan 
considerations. Doctrinaire beliefs and political spin 
take over, and uncertainty, doubt and dissent are no 
longer welcome—not even behind closed doors. Many 
crisis leaders tend to rely exclusively on inner circles 
of trusted and liked advisers in which internal con-
sensus becomes a prized asset to be defended at all 
costs. The policies that result from this self-created 
pressure cooker rarely stand the test of time. 
A second crisis reflex is to cut off debate. Leaders arm-
twist legislators to rubber stamp what are in effect 
huge policy gambles. Those who publicly doubt these 
gambles are accused of politicking and discounted as 
apologists for ‘old’ remedies that have been shown 
wrong. We have been there before when the Bush 
administration branded opponents of hastily crafted 
post-9/11 reforms as ‘unpatriotic’. 
Crisis research warns against the temptation to play 
the crisis exploitation game. The unprompted use 
of crisis rhetoric gives rise to the fundamental error 
of over-promising, which quickly ends up in under-
delivering. Imposing hasty crisis measures negates 
the intelligence of democracy: the exploring and 
reconsidering, bargaining and learning produced by 
pluralistic deliberation. The bigger the problems, the 
more leaders should resist the temptations of using 
crises to prioritise personal agendas.
Some leaders savour the prospect of 
change so deeply they will seek to 
create a sense of urgency, calculating 
that a deep crisis will temporarily 
relieve the many constraints of 
‘government as usual’.
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PhD from Leiden University, 
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When the problems are as big, baffling, and unprec-
edented as they are today, a different style of crisis 
leadership is required. Instead of advocating quick 
fixes and playing the blame game, leaders should use 
their authority to mobilise adaptive capacity within 
their societies. Citizens need to be actively involved 
in the process of rethinking the values, assumptions 
and institutions that underlie a way of life that now 
appears unsustainable. They need to ‘buy into change’ 
if that change is to succeed.
It takes wisdom and courage to resist the temptation 
of crisis exploitation. True statesmen and -women 
recognise the necessity of adaptation and use their 
political intuition to determine the shape, speed and 
direction of reform. They make sure the proposed 
adaptation fits the core values of the society that is 
to bear the brunt of reform. And they do not sacrifice 
democratic deliberation on the altar of crisis-induced 
executive dominance.
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Notes from the Field: Local Knowledge 
Preventing Disasters in Bangladesh
by Christopher Wynn
An ability to shift rapidly between natural and 
diplomatic hazards is important in conducting any 
disaster management fieldwork. I was reminded of 
this recently when I found myself introduced as the 
“European Commission Ambassador” to the large 
community of Diara, located in the rural southwest 
of Bangladesh. This fact only became more apparent 
when it was explained that accompanying my unan-
ticipated promotion was a duty to immediately deliver 
a “prepared ambassadorial speech” to an expectant 
crowd of hundreds.
 
Field work has a way of periodically throwing up 
these little challenges: the collapse of roads that were 
deemed serviceable eight hours previously, the absence 
of a plane the only clue that your flight has been 
unceremoniously cancelled, or just minor diplomatic 
misunderstandings such as my rapid and unexpected 
promotion. The unpredictability of field work encour-
ages flexibility and the capacity to adapt, skills that very 
much form the cornerstones of disaster risk reduction.
 
Disaster risk reduction is a field that, institutionally 
and academically at least, is relatively in its infancy. 
Disasters are inherently social constructions in many 
ways—strictly speaking there is no such thing as 
a “natural” disaster. Although there are certainly 
natural hazards (be they cyclones, floods, fires or 
earthquakes etc), what makes them a disaster is the 
impact they have on society. The extent of this impact 
is determined by a community’s vulnerability, and 
this can stem from a vast range of physical, environ-
mental, economic and social factors. To name just a 
few examples: strong gender divisions in a society can 
leave women reluctant to seek the safety of cramped 
cyclone shelters packed with men, poorly planned 
agricultural practices can leave vast tracts of land 
vulnerable to flooding and corruption in the building 
industry almost inevitably leads to the construction of 
buildings prone to collapse during even minor earth-
quakes. Disaster risk reduction seeks to understand 
the endless variety of risk environments in the world, 
reduce the underlying vulnerability of communities, 
and improve their capacity to cope with and adapt to 
hazards.
 
This complexity means that there is no prescribed for-
mula or universal solution to reduce disaster risk in 
Diara, a flood prone Bangladeshi community, or any-
where else. As there is no list of successive risk reduc-
tion measures that are applicable to every context and 
situation, every environment must be assessed anew 
with strategies adapted or invented accordingly to 
meet this new challenge.
 
Diara’s risk environment is particularly dire. Rising 
water levels have left the region, and in fact many 
areas of southwest Bangladesh, increasingly prone to 
water logging and floods. Homes are left uninhabit-
able and large tracts of agricultural land that once 
saw flooding for seven or eight months of the year 
are now under water for nine or ten. Old agricultural 
methods are becoming untenable, as there is simply 
not enough time to plant, grow and harvest crops 
during ever shrinking dry periods. Local food security 
and people’s very livelihoods are increasingly under 
threat. Whole communities have been forced to eke 
out an existence in small corrugated iron sheds lining 
Disasters are not natural but socially constructed, argues 
Christopher Wynn. Instead of developing universal master plans 
for disaster prevention and management, we should turn our 
eyes towards local knowledge and involve those communities 
that have lived with the local hazards for centuries.
26 Schlossplatz3
Pu
bl
ic
 S
ec
to
r
Christopher Wynn is a Pro-
gramme Officer at the Compre- 
hensive Disaster Management 
Programme ( CDMP ) for the 
United Nations Development 
Programme and Ministry  
of Food and Disaster Manage-
ment in Bangladesh. He is 
part of the Australian Youth 
Ambassadors for Development 
Programme, an AusAID initia-
tive that places skilled young 
Australians on assignments  
in developing countries 
throughout the Asia Pacific 
region. He holds a Bachelor of  
Arts with Honours in Govern-
ment and International 
Relations from the University 
of Sydney.
road embankments. Development projects designed 
to improve this deteriorating situation have not 
always borne the local risk environment in mind. A 
newly built school in Diara for instance was shortly 
inundated following its construction, necessitating 
the construction of an identical school five metres 
further down the path. The original school now sits 
there completely unused as a monument to develop-
ment waste, in an area where even rudimentary hous-
ing is at a premium. Such situations could in many 
cases simply be avoided by heading into the field and 
directly consulting with the communities in need—
the people with invariably the closest understanding 
of the local risk environment.
 
Indigenous communities around the world have 
developed a vast wealth of knowledge from living 
alongside hazards for hundreds if not thousands of 
years. The practices and methods developed by these 
communities with a sophisticated understanding of 
their local environment can potentially be of enor-
mous use to policy makers and practitioners alike for 
two key reasons. Firstly, incorporating local knowl-
edge into existing disaster risk reduction policies 
empowers a community to take the leading role in all 
disaster related processes, greatly contributing to the 
quality and sustainability of risk reduction measures. 
Secondly, these indigenous strategies can potentially 
be exported and adapted to other communities facing 
similar circumstances. For example, there are many 
communities in Bangladesh that have lived amongst 
floodplains for thousands of years, and the strategies 
they have developed to live alongside the hazards cre-
ated by this environment have great potential to aid 
newly waterlogged regions like Diara.
 
One particularly innovative strategy is the ancient 
form of crop cultivation developed in southern Bang-
ladesh of floating hydroponic gardens. The gardens 
are an all natural structure, consisting of a bamboo 
platform held afloat with water hyacinth, a common 
aquatic plant that is generally considered a nuisance 
in waterways. A wide variety of vegetables, including 
eggplant, pumpkin, and beans can then be grown 
on the floating platform. The water hyacinth doubles 
as a fertiliser for the growing plants, with vegetable 
seeds wrapped in a small ball of moist, rotting water 
hyacinth roots before being placed in the garden.
 
The Comprehensive Disaster Management Pro-
gramme (CDMP) has introduced the practice to Diara 
as part of an overall strategy to reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of the community to its changing risk environment. 
The CDMP is a collaborative effort by the Government 
of Bangladesh, the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, Department for International Development, 
and the European Commission, that seeks to move the 
emphasis of disaster management in Bangladesh from 
response and relief to a broader and more encompass-
ing risk management framework. The transferral of 
this indigenous knowledge has greatly improved the 
resilience of the people of Diara, empowering them 
to develop sustainable livelihood options to adapt 
to their new environment. Food security has vastly 
improved and the excess vegetables are sold in local 
markets to generate additional income. The gardens 
are now a key part of Diara’s strategy to reduce their 
vulnerability to the hazards that surround them.
Understanding the complexity of disaster risk  reduction 
and mainstreaming its practice across society is an 
immense task, but the integration of indigenous knowl-
edge into disaster management policy and practice will 
make that task a lot more achievable. To fully realise the 
benefits of this information, however, disaster manage-
ment practitioners will have to don a pack and head on 
out—remembering that whatever the challenges faced 
in the field, time spent there is rarely wasted.
The unpredictability of field work 
encourages flexibility and the capacity 
to adapt, skills that very much form 
the cornerstones of disaster risk 
reduction.
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“Meeting the Worst Case Scenario”: 
How Crisis Managers Prepare Companies and 
Public Institutions for Critical Situations
by Frank Roselieb 
Corruption allegations, hacker attacks or product recalls—in most 
cases, critical incidents do not come completely unforeseen.  
In contrast, their origins lie way before in the context of standard 
business processes. For this reason, the crisis management system 
of a company or institution should be established long before  
the actual occurrence of a critical incident. Frank Roselieb outlines 
the four steps of crisis prevention, crisis identification, crisis 
management and crisis recovery. 
“Armed for the real thing”: Methods of systematic 
crisis prevention
The absence of perceivable crisis signals is what is 
considered as the normal state of a company or an 
institution. To prepare for the case of emergency, 
crisis managers establish the following ten services 
within the company or institution:
Crisis audit Based on a database-driven analysis of 
past crises and on interviews within the company 
or institution, the crisis manager detects potential 
causes and types of crises and assesses them with 
respect to their probability of occurrence and their 
amount of loss. The determined crisis potential is the 
starting point for all measures of crisis prevention 
and crisis management.
Crisis infrastructure By systematically detecting the 
organisational structure, the communication chan-
nels and the possibly existent measures of risk man-
agement, the crisis manger analyses the crisis capac-
ity of the company or institution. The improvement 
of the crisis infrastructure ranges from the selection 
of members for the crisis management team and the 
preparation of communication strategies for various 
crisis scenarios to the composition of an external 
expert network.
Crisis manual  In close co-operation with the company 
or institution, the crisis manager prepares and assorts 
essential process sequence routines for various types 
of crises, contact persons, basic rules for responding 
to press inquiries, standard texts for press releases 
etc. in a crisis manual. Amongst others, the manual 
also contains objective criteria for the occurrence of 
a crisis, alert plans and a catalogue of questions and 
answers for the crisis call centre. 
Crisis internet portal The complete crisis manual, 
together with more and regularly updated informa-
tion on the company’s or institution’s crisis preven-
tion, is provided on two coextensive, particularly 
guarded servers. This crisis internet portal can only 
be accessed by the crisis management team. It allows 
a cost-efficient update of the crisis information and 
can be used even if the company’s or institution’s own 
internet pages are not accessible.
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‘Dark sites’ The crisis manager configurates internet 
pages that contain background information on the 
company or institution. In an acute crisis, these dark 
sites can be activated and endorsed with additional 
information within minutes. On the one hand, dark 
sites save the company or institution from having to 
answer to the same questions over and over again. On 
the other hand, they show the public that the crisis is 
handled candidly instead of being concealed. 
Crisis workshop In a one-day crisis workshop, the 
crisis manager sensitises executives by means of case 
studies for the need of systematic crisis prevention. 
In the training, the functionality of the crisis internet 
portal is just as well explained as the part and respon-
sibilities of each member of the crisis management 
team.
Crisis training In an interactive training for executives 
and members of the press office, the crisis manager 
shows how the media reacts in crises. Realistic exer-
cises—for example press conferences or talk shows—
teach how to place core messages of the company or 
institution. 
Crisis simulation On the basis of a fictitious, but real-
istic scenario of a potential crisis, the crisis manager 
simulates inquiries of stakeholders like customers, 
media, the public etc. in order to train the co-operation 
of the crisis management team. The documentation 
and evaluation of the crisis simulation shows options 
to optimise the crisis infrastructure and organisation. 
Crisis preparedness The company’s or institution’s 
crisis information is updated on a regular basis, the 
early warning systems are adjusted to altered general 
conditions, and crisis workshops and crisis training 
for new staff members take place once or twice a 
year. Furthermore, the crisis manager can be reached 
round the clock via an emergency telephone number 
for real-time help in an acute crisis.
Crisis certificate The measures of crisis prevention 
make a substantial contribution to the required infor-
mation tasks of a company or institution—for exam-
ple the EC General Food Law Regulation 178/2002. By 
request, the external crisis manager or another audit-
ing institution issues certificates than can be shown 
to third parties such as banks, accountants or public 
institutions in order to document the implementation 
of such measures in the company or institution. 
“Perceiving weak signals on time”—Tools for crisis 
identification
To become aware of the development of critical inci-
dents, it is advisable to implement adequate warning 
systems for the identification of such ‘weak signals’. 
Although the outer world usually does not perceive any 
hints of the impending crisis at that time, adequate 
measures have to be taken to prevent it from erupting. 
The crisis manager supports companies and institu-
tions by means of the following well proven and eco-
nomically reasonable concepts:
Early warning system and ‘anti-whistle-blowing-
system’ An early warning system continuously and 
systematically monitors media reports, customers’ 
expression of opinion in online discussion forums, 
activities of critical stakeholders, planned legislation 
projects etc. The crisis manager continuously adjusts 
this early warning system to the specific needs of the 
company or institution and provides real-time infor-
mation about critical developments to them. An impor-
tant part of the early warning system is the integration 
of a so-called ‘anti-whistle-blowing-system’ that pro-
tects the company or institution from being ‘snitched 
on’ to authorities or the media by staff members.
Issues management and incident management After 
having identified not only critical issues and negative 
developments, but also conceivable opportunities, the 
crisis manager advises and supports the company or 
institution with the initiation of adequate measures. 
These measures range from the moderation of the 
dialogue with critical stakeholders to the realisation 
of public relation campaigns in order to put lopsided 
media reports into perspective. If required, the  crisis 
manager integrates additional experts from the 
partner network—for example, lawyers, psycholo-
gists, economists, chemists, health professionals and 
many more.
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“Speaking with one voice”—Strategies of crisis 
communication
For the company or institution, the acute crisis starts 
with the crisis perception in the outer world. This can 
be caused by failed intra-corporate crisis prevention 
or by the surprising suddenness of the critical inci-
dent. The crisis manager offers the following four 
services in order to assist companies and institutions 
that are affected by an acute crisis:
Ad hoc crisis consulting and crisis management 
Within 30 minutes after the arrival of a crisis alert, the 
crisis manager activates the crisis management team 
that consists of interdisciplinary and multi-lingual 
staff members. Thus, the crisis manager is available 
via telephone, video conference or e-mail, even before 
the other company’s or institution’s own staff mem-
bers arrive.
On-site crisis consulting and crisis management If 
required, the crisis manager sends qualified staff 
members to the company, the institution or to the 
crisis location immediately after the crisis alert. 
Through this the company’s or institution’s own 
crisis management team gets professional support 
in crisis management and crisis communication—
from the ‘briefing’ of the crisis call centre to the 
organisation of press conferences and the continuous 
documentation of media reports. 
Real-time crisis communication After consultation 
with the company or institution, the crisis manager 
activates and updates dark sites and co-ordinates pro-
ceeding actions. If required, the crisis manager also 
composes press releases, provides a crisis call centre 
and answers to press inquiries.
Online crisis documentation In an online crisis log 
that can only be accessed by the members of the com-
pany’s or institution’s crisis management team, the 
crisis manager documents all measures of the opera-
tive and communicative crisis management that are 
taken. Furthermore, media reports are continuously 
monitored and documented.
“Utilising crisis as opportunity”—Communication 
strategies for trust building
In the aftermath of the acute crisis, the company or 
institution is to analyse the past events and to learn 
lessons for the future. The crisis manager helps to 
regain public faith and to optimise the company’s or 
institution’s warning systems by the following mea-
sures:
Crisis analysis After having undergone a crisis, the 
crisis manager analyses and moderates necessary 
change processes on the company’s or institution’s 
side. This can mean measures like the modification 
of the hitherto existing communication strategy, 
the adaptation of the crisis infrastructure and an 
additional training for or changes within the crisis 
management team. 
Crisis dialogue In order to win back public trust and 
to observably learn from the crisis, the company 
or institution is supported by the crisis manager in 
implementing adequate communicative measures. 
These measures contain so-called ‘apology adverts’ 
in newspapers, the organisation and moderation of 
workshops for journalists and the setup of informa-
tive internet portals.
Crisis documentation If required by the company or 
institution, the crisis manager prepares a documen-
tation of the crisis in the form of a brochure or book. 
In addition to a detailed chronology of the events, the 
documentation also contains a listing of the crisis 
management measures the company or institution 
has taken. By this, the company or institution can 
prove that the critical incident has not been concealed 
at any time—if third parties like stakeholders, media 
or public institutions ever accuse them of having 
done so.
Frank Roselieb is the 
director and spokesman  
of Crisisnavigator—Institute 
for Crisis Research, a  
spin-off of the University of 
Kiel, and a board member  
of the German Association for 
Crisis Management e.V.  
He specialises in crisis  
communication via the inter-
net, issues management  
for public insitutions, risk  
communication and  
catastrophy management  
after terrorist attacks. 
30 Schlossplatz3
More than a Communication Discipline: 
Reputation Risk Management
by Martin David Ledwon and Christoph Mielke 
As the media has an enormous effect on consumers’ behaviour  
and public opinion trends, attaining a certain reputation, keeping 
their reputation or even increasing their reputation has become  
an important aspect for big as well as small companies.  
As Martin David Ledwon and Christoph Mielke point out, crises  
are sometimes unavoidalbe, but reputation risk management  
can help companies mitigate their risks, contain the damage  
and preserve their reputations. 
In 2005 the Economist Intelligence Unit published a 
study claiming that reputation risk is now the greatest 
risk facing global companies—exceeding traditional 
IT, financial or human capital risks. Now, more than 
ever, companies are recognising the importance 
of managing and measuring their reputations and 
keeping a close eye on the changing expectations of 
stakeholders. Almost every incident a company faces 
will find its way into the public domain or will be 
known among audiences. This is a factor critical to 
the company’s success. Take Arthur Anderson, for 
instance: tinkering with clients’ financial reports 
culminated in the spectacular scandal around Enron 
and led to the extinction of the company. This is not 
because licenses were withdrawn. The company lost 
its credibility—arguably one of the biggest assets of 
an auditing firm and the centrepiece of its reputation. 
So, ultimately, Arthur Anderson failed because of an 
incurable loss of reputation.
This example, albeit simplified, underlines the stra-
tegic business value of a structured and sustainable 
approach to reputation risk management and the 
importance of considering the ‘Return of Reputation’ 
(ROR) for strategic business decisions. The structural 
basis already exists in most cases. Chief risk officers 
oversee the identification and evaluation of strategic 
business risks and develop sufficient management 
responses to them. What’s often lacking is a system-
atic approach to reputational risk management. 
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Managing reputation risk is a 
straightforward process that builds 
on established infrastructure 
around quality control, complaint 
management and the routine 
evaluation of apparent IT, financial 
and environmental risks.
Managing reputation risk is a straightforward pro- 
cess that builds on established infrastructure around 
quality control, complaint management and the 
routine evaluation of apparent IT, financial and en- 
vironmental risks. While the process is in many 
ways dictated by the organisational structure of the 
individual company, it is critical that reputation risk 
management is driven or visibly supported by the CEO 
or executive board. 
Understanding Reputation
The first challenge is to understand the company’s 
reputation—both the actual as well as the desired. 
Although most companies are intimately familiar 
with their brands and the attributes that define them, 
few executives have a clear understanding of the ele-
ments that define their company’s reputation—even 
though a majority of CEOs say it is the most important 
intangible asset held by a company. Corporate reputa-
tion is the extent to which the company is meeting 
the expectations of society and all of the company’s 
stakeholders. While the brand concerns the relation-
ship consumers have with your products and services, 
reputation denotes the perceptions and goodwill all 
stakeholders have for the company. 
Research on the stakeholders’ expectations for an 
individual company is perhaps a company’s most 
important tool to protect and enhance its reputation. 
Strategic communication practitioners have devel-
oped ways to measure reputation through opinion 
research, focus groups, strategic media analysis and 
more. 
Reputation Risk Analysis
The next logical step is to analyse the specific risks 
associated with this cluster and to evaluate them. 
Some of these risks are apparent, such as poor product 
quality, bad behaviour toward employees or apparent 
corporate responsibility shortfalls. Other reputation 
risks are harder to define as they depend, for instance, 
on shifts in public opinion or certain regulatory 
and political trends. For example, who would have 
expected the German government to viciously turn 
against private equity companies in Germany in 2005, 
likening them in a rather drastic rhetoric burst of lin-
gua tertii imperii to locusts?
In addition to assessing parameters such as likeli-
hood and frequency of possible negative incidents, 
less apparent contexts such as opinion trends, politi-
cal climate changes and incidents in other industry 
contexts have to be considered. Brainstorming, busi-
ness risk reports and comparative media analyses can 
provide the necessary guidance—external reputation 
experts with a proven track record in a certain sector 
can be used to complement internal resources and 
provide fresh views. Ultimately, the company will be 
able to rely on a comprehensive analysis of the most 
apparent reputation risks.
Active Reputation Management
Reputation management typically rests on two pil-
lars: preparation of resources for crisis response and 
active strengthening of reputation in areas where a 
distinct risk to reputation exists. Crisis preparedness 
and reaction is rather tactical in nature and best prac-
tices have been widely discussed and established. By 
contrast, active reputation management is often pur-
sued rather half-heartedly in the context of singular 
communication campaigns and short-term projects. 
Actively managing reputation is a strategic task that 
should focus on streamlining communication, pub-
lic affairs and corporate responsibility in a way that 
allows fortifying a company’s external profile against 
reputational challenges such as critical coverage, con-
sumer campaigns, political initiatives and the like.
APCO Worldwide was  
founded in 1984 and is a lead-
ing global public affairs and 
communication consultancy 
with 32 offices all around the 
world. APCO’s core services 
include government relations, 
strategic and corporate 
communi cation as well as 
crisis management. Building 
and managing reputation is  
one of APCO’s key areas 
of expertise and APCO has 
supported numerous small, 
medium-sized and multi-
national companies in manag-
ing communication crises  
and reputational risks. 
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While the literature on the manage-
ment of communication crises  
is abundant, the best practices sur-
rounding crisis response can be 
summed up this way: be consistent, 
transparent, thoughtful, timely  
and all-embracing.
This strategy usually involves organising speaking 
opportunities, media relations, corporate responsi-
bility and investor relations activities in a way that is 
directed to enhancing the corporate reputation. These 
activities should be authentic and should genuinely 
reflect the company’s culture, vision and values. To 
assure that marketing and other non-communication 
disciplines equally support this approach, the reputa-
tion goals derived from the reputation risk analysis 
should be translated into planning patterns to govern 
the strategic and tactical work in these disciplines. 
Effective internal communication and support from 
company leadership is essential. 
Crisis: Reputation Damage Control 
Risks can always turn into actual events. Sometimes 
there is simply no way to prevent a crisis. Responding 
quickly and responsibly is the best solution. While the 
literature on the management of communication cri-
ses is abundant, the best practices surrounding crisis 
response can be summed up this way: be consistent, 
transparent, thoughtful, timely and all-embracing. 
The negative effects crises inevitably have on a com-
pany’s reputation can be mitigated far more easily and 
efficiently by companies who already have a strong 
reputation.
Continued Reputation Risk Monitoring
Continued actualisation of the status quo of corporate 
reputation and of the reputational goals of a company 
is just as important for holistic reputation risk man-
agement. The stakeholder environment is constantly 
changing. Perceptions vary, and trends are fleet-
ing. With the emergence of social media as a global 
building block in the formation of public opinion 
trends, corporate reputation has become increasingly 
short-lived. Companies should continually reassess 
their reputation risks as part of the overall reputation 
management process. 
Reputation risks might never be so foreseeable and 
manageable that the impact on corporate reputation 
is completely negligible. But it can be asserted that 
through a comprehensive and systematic reputation 
risk management approach, companies can mitigate 
their risks, contain the damage and preserve their 
reputations.
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“We Have Been Able to Stabilise 
the Financial Market.”
The interview with State Secretary Jörg Asmussen was conducted by 
Noor Naqschbandi and Simone Stelten in March 2009.
Why did Germany react to the Financial Crisis the way it did?  
What is Germany’s strategy to overcome the crisis and how likely 
is this strategy to succeed? State Secretary Jörg Asmussen of the 
German Ministry of Finance shares his thoughts about Germany’s 
crisis management strategy in the current Financial Crisis. 
How would you describe the crisis management 
strategy of the German government with regard 
to the financial crisis?  
Our crisis management strategy with regard to the 
financial markets was very much the same as in many 
other countries. You develop a toolbox mainly consist-
ing of three instruments: First, you provide guaran-
tees in order to provide liquidity to banks or financial 
institutions; second, you recapitalise them; and the 
third tool that you have available is to take bad assets 
out of the bank. This tool has, in principle, been avail-
able from the beginning, but we have not used it until 
now. So, this is the tool box that we have presented 
with the ‘Financial Markets Stabilisation Act’ in 
October, and then we had to decide on a case-by-case 
basis which one is the best to apply to a certain bank 
in order to stabilise the whole system.
 
How would you assess this strategy? 
We have been able to stabilise financial markets. So, 
we are no longer in danger of a collapse of the system. 
What still remains to be done is to put the system back 
on track as, for example, money markets are still not 
really functioning. Access to credit has become more 
difficult for some companies of the so-called real 
economy. We are not back to normal, we have stabi-
lised the situation, but the rest needs to be done.
 
What was your personal impact as a crisis man-
ager?
I think it was very limited. The major crisis managers 
in Germany were the Finance Minister and the Chan-
cellor. And all other people involved just provided 
options. 
What influences you during decision-making?
First, in the ministry of finance, there is a huge team 
of people with whom one develops and discusses the 
ideas. So there are always one or two people seen 
in the front, with many more people working in 
the background. And if I have to name people, it is 
the President of the Federal Bank Axel Weber or my 
colleague Jens Weidmann in the Chancellor’s office 
with whom I can discuss ideas and try to move them 
forward.
 
Do you think that the role of the state will change 
after the financial crisis? 
I think the issue is not whether its impact will increase 
or decrease. Yes, its role will change. The state must 
always adapt to the environment, taking the innova-
tions that appear in certain markets into account. I 
think it was Larry Summers who many years ago said 
that the role of the state is an extremely important one, 
but a very limited one.
What are the most important global reforms 
with regard to the financial crisis? 
I think the question is how to make the system more 
stable—to strengthen the shock absorbers in order to 
allow the system to respond to external shocks. On 
the macro-level, we have to deal with the question of 
global financial imbalances. But we should not forget 
The role of the state is an extremely 
important one, but a very limited one.
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that we have topics beyond this financial crisis that 
have to do with climate change, food security, water 
security. And these global problems remain, they just 
slightly moved away from the headlines of the news-
papers. 
 
How would you define “systemic relevance”? 
We always avoid giving a general definition to the 
public because that would create certain moral hazard 
among financial institutions because then they know: 
okay, I am relevant for the system so they will save 
me. We always say that we will decide in the current 
situation depending on market conditions: in which 
market segment is the institute active and which are 
the links to other banks? We will never give a general 
definition to the public; we will decide it case by case. 
You have been in the centre of financial processes, 
and as a member of the lobby-organisation 
“True Sale International GmbH” you promoted 
asset-backed securities in Germany while prob-
lems with ABS were one of the main causes of the 
financial crisis. How do you explain your being 
surprised by the financial crisis?
There was a combination of various elements that 
caused the financial crisis and not a single factor. 
Securitisation will stay, in principle it is a good instru-
ment of risk allocation. It is certainly one lesson from 
the crisis that securitisation has to to change so that 
you get to more standardised products which are less 
intransparent, which are easier to evaluate, easier to 
understand. So the basic idea of securitisation is not 
a wrong one but we definitely need to better apply it. 
Securitisation will stay, in principle 
it is a good instrument of risk 
allocation. It is certainly one lesson 
from the crisis that securitisation has 
to to change so that you get to more 
standardised products which are  
less intransparent, which are easier to 
evaluate, easier to understand.
Jörg Asmussen has been 
State Secretary in the German 
Ministry of Finance since  
July 2008. From 2003 to 2008 
he was Director for “National 
and International Financial 
Market and Monetary Policy” 
in the Ministry of Finance,  
during which Mr. Asmussen 
was also the representative  
of the German Government  
in the Supervisory Board  
of the German IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank. From 2003  
to 2008 he belonged to  
the advisory board of True 
Sale International GmbH,  
a lobby organisation that pro- 
moted asset-backed securi-
ties. He studied Economics  
at the University of Bonn  
and at the Bocconi University 
Milan.
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Although Hertie Graduates tend to work in very diverse jobs  
in the civilian, public, and private sector, there is one 
characteristic many of these jobs share: they are connected to 
overcoming some kind of crisis. Here are two examples  
of Hertie Graduates working as crisis manager. 
The Zimbabwean Crisis?
by Robert Marten
“You have inherited a jewel. Keep it that 
way.” These were the words of Tanzanian 
leader Julius Nyerere to newly elected 
Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert 
Mugabe in 1980. Mugabe has not kept it 
that way. On the contrary, Zimbabwe has 
become in many ways a failed state. While 
the still relatively new government of 
unity is making some progress, the situa-
tion is clearly one of crisis. 
In the past the country was commonly 
referred to as the ‘Switzerland of Africa’,  
Zimbabwe was recently called an “out-
post of tyranny”. Over the last decade, 
the country’s economy based on mining, 
agriculture and tourism has crumbled;  
its political system based on the  
whims of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF 
party has become a virtual dictator-
ship.  Zimbabwe’s decline is most evident 
when one examines the health and 
education of the nation. 
One recent investigation referred to 
Zimbabwe’s health system as in a state of 
“utter collapse” which is “unprecedented 
in scale and scope”; a senior Ministry 
of Health official commented “the 
healthcare system has virtually stopped” 
in December 2008. The health system 
was, and to a large degree, remains 
in shambles; many of the schools and 
universities closed during the last 
year and are only slowly beginning to 
re-open. This crisis is all the more devas-
tating as these were the sectors in which 
Mugabe heavily invested during the 
1980s, and in which, in fact, Zimbabwe 
made great progress. 
After graduating from the Hertie School 
of Governance in May 2008, I began  
a job which took me to Southern Africa.  
Since then I have had a few opportunities 
to visit Zimbabwe. The first time was 
something of a whim. Fearing reactions 
given the headlines of the time, I pur-
pose fully did not tell friends or  relatives 
until days before. Yet, the supposed 
crisis I encountered at the border was 
non-existent. 
We were greeted by friendly and curious 
officials in crisp uniforms and welcomed 
to the country. While we paid our visa 
fees in US dollars and joked with some 
about relations between our countries, 
other officials were enraptured by a 
show on the Discovery Channel about 
crocodiles in Australia. 
In Harare, were it not for the cues of 
hundreds of people waiting at bank 
machines, the cues of cars at the petrol 
stations and many empty shelves in 
shops, you might think you were in a 
 normal country. Indeed, restaurants 
served delicious food, bars delivered 
music and drinks and on stages through-
out the city actors were going through 
their lines. There was even ballet.  
People were incredibly open, gracious  
and forthcoming about the situation.  
It was a crisis.
Robert Marten graduated 
from the Hertie School of 
Governance in May 2008 and 
worked for the German  
Technical Co-operation in 
Lusaka, Zambia from Septem-
ber 2008 to September 2009. 
He previously worked at the 
Global Public Policy Institute 
( GPPi ) and is currently 
completing a consultancy for 
the World Health Organisation 
( WHO ).
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Legitimacy Crises as Roots 
of Conflict: The Case of Maasai 
Pastoralists in Tanzania
by Kristine Garrucho
Crises can emerge when existing institu-
tions suffer deficiencies in legitimacy. 
In Tanzania, land-related conflicts 
can be rooted in asymmetries in the 
land laws’ creation and implementa-
tion. This is because historical power 
dynamics shaped institutions that afford 
centralised and unchecked authority to 
the Tanzanian state—and this, in turn, 
unilaterally assumes values that are not 
necessarily consistent with those held 
by the constituency it is supposed to 
represent. Using the experience of Maasai 
pastoralists as a point of reference, there 
are noted inconsistencies between their 
interests and the state’s assumed values 
particularly around investment and 
conservation.
Investment and conservation are not 
inherently undesirable for the Maasai, 
whose traditional way of life is poised to 
gain from better access to resources  
(e.g. technology, health, etc.) and from 
the preservation of the natural environ-
ment. However, these ‘desirables’ can 
also be perverted especially when they 
serve as the rationale for what the group 
terms as ‘land grabbing’ of the state in 
the guise of public interest. In practice, 
this is concretised through the displace-
ment of the Maasai from their traditional 
lands in favour of hunting game reserves 
and gated national parks, which are key 
features in the tourism industry. 
The unchecked authority afforded to the 
state, which is assumed legitimate from 
the legal perspective, make the Maasai’s 
marginalisation possible. Although they 
are part of the citizens represented by 
the state, it does not necessarily follow 
that their interests are assumed. This is 
evidenced through the recourse that  
institutions offer in the face of displace-
ment, which is to force the Maasai’s 
‘modernisation’ through their abandon-
ment of pastoralism in favour of settle-
ment in villages.
Aside from settlement being inconsistent 
with Maasai fundamental values and 
centuries-old survival mechanisms, 
options are also lacking to enable them to 
keep their traditions intact. For this rea-
son, it is common for pastoralists that opt 
to preserve traditional practices to figure 
in violent clashes with other land users, 
particularly farmers, as it is happening in 
the country’s Kilosa district.
The Tanzania case provides an insight as 
to how more apparent crises (e.g. peace) 
can be linked with deeper legitimacy cri-
ses suffered by state institutions. For this 
reason, a challenge is posed around the 
need to address questions of legitimacy, 
particularly through building a construc-
tive relationship between the state and its 
citizens so that a state building process 
that is in sync with traditional values can 
be facilitated.
Kristine Garrucho graduated 
from the Hertie School in May 
2009. She completed the  
dual degree with SIPA, where 
she was part of a workshop 
team that conducted a study 
on land, governance, and 
legitimacy in Tanzania for 
the Paris-based Institute for 
Research and Debate on  
Governance ( IRG ). Further-
more, she has had various 
involvements in local gover-
nance capacity building  
in the Philippines and other 
parts of Asia.
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The Climate Change Workshop 
Berlin
by Lion Hirth and Dania Röpke
The Climate Change Workshop Berlin  
is comprised of Hertie and non-Hertie 
students and young professionals 
interested in climate change issues. We 
meet every other week in a small group 
of about ten people at the Hertie School 
of Governance for presentations and 
informal discussions. Our aim is to 
broaden our understanding of climate 
change related issues and to discuss 
viable solutions to halt global warming.
Some insights into our meetings:
Economics of Reduction of Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) with Lion Hirth from the 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research
Emissions from land-use change account 
for roughly a fifth of global anthropo-
genic greenhouse gas emissions. The vast 
majority (> 90 %) of these emissions stem 
from tropical deforestation, mainly from 
Brazil and Indonesia. Forests are directly 
affected by climate change: While coming 
under severe stress due to changing 
precipitation patterns in some parts of 
the world, Siberian boreal forests expand 
north following a warmer climate. 
Forest protection is often thought of as a 
relatively low-cost mitigation option  
with significant ‘side benefits’ in terms 
of biodiversity. Reducing tropical 
 deforestation is not covered, however,  
by the Kyoto protocol. After this intro-
ductory information we debated the  
big future question: What kind of policy 
regime allows effective protection  
of world’s tropical forests?
The Pros and Cons of the Clean  
Development Mechanisms with Lambert 
Schneider from the Institute  
for Applied Ecology (Öko-Institut)
In his introductory statement, Lambert 
Schneider presented some ten core theses 
about the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)—most of them being rather criti-
cal towards the mechanism. Most impor-
tantly, both the projects’ additionality and 
the CDM’s contribution to sustainable 
development are highly questionable 
for a large number of projects. Without 
additionality, the ecological integrity of 
the Kyoto protocol (and the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme) is, however, lost. The 
following debate focused on the question 
of whether to prioritise climate protection 
over sustainable development and the 
problems to quantify the latter. While 
several participations remained highly 
critical towards CDM, others emphasised 
achievements such as large-scale cash 
transfers, technology diffusion, and 
increased awareness both in the North 
and the South.
The Hertie School of Governance developed a lively and extensive net 
of extra-curricular activities. Next to the Editorial Team Schlossplatz3, 
there are also various political groups, such as Macht Morgen (Hertie’s 
Young Politicans Series), environmental rounds and sports groups  
such as the Berlin Marathon, Basketball and Soccer team. Learn 
more about two of these extra-curricular groups, the Climate Change 
Workshop Berlin and the YPSilon Young Professionals Series.
Campus Spotlight
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YPSilon Invited Professionals 
from PricewaterhouseCoopers 
and Volkswagen’s Berlin 
Representative Office
by Simone Stelten
YPSilon is Hertie’s Young Professionals 
Series and was established by a group of 
students to create an additional platform 
for exchange and career-oriented net-
working. This spring’s sessions focused 
on possible future employers from the 
private sector. Frank Weise from Price-
waterhouseCoopers and Hans-Christian 
Maaß, head of the representation office 
of the Volkswagen AG in Berlin, offered 
personal insights into their daily work. 
On March 10th, Mr. Weise introduced  
the students to the world of consulting. 
PwC operates in three service lines 
—assurance, tax, and advisory—which 
the company offers to different 
industries, also encompassing public 
institutions. Mr. Weise is a partner of 
PwC, working in the public sector depart-
ment. With a background in Economics 
and Law, Mr. Weise previously worked 
for a local government. Later he decided 
to switch sectors and to start a career in 
consulting. The compatibility of career 
and family life can be a tough task—Mr. 
Weise does not deny the downsides of 
his business. However, he speaks enthu-
siastically about his work that he consid-
ers incredibly diverse and challenging. 
Usually, he works intensely on a specific 
project, but for a limited amount of time. 
While working on the project, he is in 
close contact with the heads of the client 
institutions and quickly needs to gain 
insight into the clients’ challenges and 
their room for manoeuvre. “We always try 
to be the ‘thought leader’”—consultants 
have to think differently and need to have 
a taste for lucrative topics and new tools. 
Mr. Weise considers an aphorism of Mark 
Twain his personal anti-truism: “When 
the only tool you own is a hammer, every 
problem begins to resemble a nail”. When 
it comes to recruiting, Mr. Weise refers to 
the MPP as an optimal qualification since 
the field requires a sound understanding 
of public sector business. He searches 
for people who show genuine motivation 
with an excellent faculty of expression 
and abstraction—“I don’t hire graduates 
that are not able to explain their master 
theses in a few words”.
On March 18th, Mr. Maaß shared 
insights into his work: representing the 
interests of Europe’s largest automotive 
manufacturer. Following posts in 
the field of public affairs, the former 
spokesperson for the Federal Ministry 
of Transport has been co-ordinating the 
lobbying activities of the VW Group since 
2007. The cornerstone of Maaß’ work is 
to act as an early warning system for the 
company’s management. His task is to 
deal with political issues that could affect 
the company and to formulate appropri-
ate reactions. “I don’t like the expression 
that we are influencing policy-making”— 
Mr. Maaß rather describes his business as 
a process of talking and going for lunch 
with relevant people. In a nutshell, it is all 
about networking. Lobbying strategies do 
not merely deal with the primary public 
addressees such as government, parlia-
ment and administrations. They also 
concentrate on forging strategic alliances 
with stakeholders, e.g. other companies, 
think tanks, unions or NGOs. In order 
to pursue a proper career in this field, 
candidates need to have social skills and a 
‘feeling’ for people, but also be quick and 
flexible when diving into new topics. Mr. 
Maaß considers a sound understanding 
of the processes within the automotive 
branch as second to none. By contrast, 
consultancies that take over public affairs 
management for clients rather require 
the ambition and the expertise to rapidly 
become acquainted with new industries 
and branches.
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Visit Schlossplatz3 online 
All Schlossplatz3 content is available online. You can read articles 
and download back issues in .pdf format at the Hertie School 
of Governance website. Just go to www.hertie-school.org/
schlossplatz3/, then click “Printed” on the right side of the page. 
Schlossplatz3 in the Blogosphere
In January 2008, Schlossplatz3 went online with its own blog. 
The blog regularly features articles and interviews by prominent 
policy experts from around the world, as well as contributions  
from students, faculty and visitors of the Hertie School of 
Governance. Readers can also comment on articles in the blog, 
print edition, or other policy topics by e-mailing us at  
sp3@mpp.hertie-school.org. You can find the Schlossplatz3 blog at 
www.hertie-school.org/schlossplatz3
Next Issue 
Where does the future of ‘labour’ lie? In times of increasing global  
interdependence, labour markets have changed rapidly. 
Demographic changes in the industrialised world are accompanied 
by mass labour migration. Regional networks, such as the European 
Union, introduce labour standards while many of the poorer 
countries compete for low costs and have to disregard labour 
protections.
The up-coming Schlossplatz3 issue will deal with some of the 
questions that circle around the future of labour. What normative 
changes are necessary in order to prevent the exploitation of 
workers in poor countries while at the same time protecting 
those in the richer parts of the world? And how will the working 
environment change? What regulation could we expect with 
regards to welfare benefits or health standards? The eighth issue of 
Schlossplatz3 will appear in spring 2010. 
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